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In light of the chaotic and current situation in Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen, 
international observers consider the Tunisian experience to be the reference 
model of political change in the region. In spite of assassinations, tensions and 
conflicts that emerged within and outside of its Parliament, Tunisia managed 
to free public speech, to create a pluralist political arena and to obtain a demo-
cratic constitution adopted by the National Constituent Assembly. This second 
transitional phase resulted in the upholding of parliamentarian and presiden-
tial elections. Glowing reports of the international community and local self-
triumph put aside, the Tunisian trajectory should be scrutinized in order to go 
beyond simplistic interpretations of the dynamics at work.
The 2011 uprisings have initiated a continuing process of redefinition of 
political forces and alliances. Key elements of this process include the insti-
tutionalization of political Islam through the Ennahda party, the assertion of 
the Salafi movement in the public sphere, the shift from one type a collation 
of former opponents to the Ben Ali regime in the years 2011–2014 (the “troika” 
of cpr-Ettakatol and Ennahda) to an alliance between Islamists and the anti-
Islamist party of Nida Tounes. However, competition for power does not by 
itself explain the dynamics that have unfolded within the Tunisian political 
sphere. Since 2011, the observable political struggle tightly correlates with dis-
putes over the introduction of new narratives and new interpretations about 
the revolution. The widespread celebration of consensus, for example, does 
not merely reflect an objective balance of power among political forces. It also 
contributes to naturalizing an interpretation of Tunisian politics, in which 
dissent is a threat to national unity rather than an ingredient of democracy. 
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To the regime’s fall is hence tied a struggle for meaning, one that is inseparable 
from the struggle for power. It has divided the country along multiple lines that 
oppose business elites to the “people”; Islamists vs. secularists; the upper class 
and urban elites to the rural “inland” regions; the North to the South; Political 
Islam to Tunisianity; the national to the diaspora, etc. This special issue seeks 
to examine this very relationship between the battle for power and the compe-
tition over truths and narratives.
Social scientists and experts have not remained insulated from these dis-
putes around the interpretation of the transition. While scholars of Tunisia 
have suddenly multiplied after 2011, they have been confronted with funda-
mental ethical and epistemological questions. In addition to the difficult task 
of trying to ascribe some stable meaning to a process in the making, the high 
emotional charge involved in the study of a revolution and a transition has 
been a major challenge. Until 2011, the social scientific literature on post-inde-
pendence Tunisia, and more specifically on the Ben Ali authoritarian regime 
has been scarce.1 The difficult condition of doing fieldwork in the repressive 
context of a highly policed state is the main explanation for this seeming lack 
of interest. After 2011, given the relative scarcity of the corpus of political and 
sociological analysis of post-independence Tunisia, several experts have elabo-
rated analyses of the post-revolution dynamics that were based on external 
models (drawn from Eastern Europe, Asia or Latin America), rather than on 
the consideration of Tunisia’s own history.2
The sudden outburst of academic enthusiasm for Tunisia has undoubt-
edly contributed to a better understanding of the complexity of the current 
transformations. Tunisia, however, regularly appears in these works as a 
case of study, the function of which is to allow scholars to test and verify the-
ories that have been elaborated for very different contexts. Moreover, a gap 
1 Michel Camau, ed., Tunisie au présent : une modernité au-dessus de tout soupçon ? (Paris: Édi-
tions du cnrs, 1987); Michel Camau and Vincent Geisser, Le Syndrome autoritaire : Politique 
en Tunisie de Bourguiba à Ben Ali (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2003); Jean-Pierre Cassa-
rino, Tunisian New Entrepreneurs and their Past Experiences of Migration in Europe: Resource 
Mobilisation, Networks, and Hidden Disaffection (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2000); Béa-
trice Hibou, La force de l’obéissance : Economie politique de la répression en Tunisie (Paris: La 
Découverte, 2006); Eva Bellin, Stalled Democracy: Capital, Labor, and the Paradox of State 
Sponsored Development (New York: Cornell University Press, 2002).
2 Nataliya Gumenyuk, “How Framing of Revolutions (the Arab Spring and Maidan) Takes 
Us Away from Their Roots During and After the Protests,” SciencesPo Centre de Recherches 
Internationales, January 2016, http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/content/dossiersduceri/
how-framing-revolutions-arab-spring-and-maidan-takes-us-away-their-roots-during-and 
-after?d10.
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quickly became visible between the growing number of scholars and experts 
(Tunisian or non Tunisian) based in Western universities who began to write 
about the revolution and the transition process, and the Tunisian youth that 
has experienced the whole process, but has had a peripheral part in the aca-
demic and policy conversation. In other words, the political earthquake trig-
gered by Bouazizi’s self immolation has not been followed (yet) by a decisive 
change in the power dynamics defining the production of knowledge about 
Tunisia (and, possibly, the Arab world more broadly). The well-entrenched 
repartition of tasks whereby local scholars provide data, and scholars based at 
Western universities define theories has continued. Very early on, Mona Abaza 
has denounced the unequal relations of power in the economy of the nascent 
expert industry on the Arab revolutions, and has mocked the growing number 
of “Academic tourists sightseeing the Arab Spring”.3 Since Abaza published her 
article, some young Tunisian or Tunisia-based academics, experts, journalists, 
activists and artists have actively taken part in debates, and proposed original 
ideas, or artistic forms. The broad political economy of academic and policy 
expertise however continues to make it more difficult for them to have access 
to prestigious international journals, universities, and venues where a new 
normative knowledge about Tunisia is being made and written, without them. 
Raising this issue is not meant at justifying any form of academic nationalism, 
whereby only Tunisia based scholars could legitimately write about their coun-
try. It does not mean either that one should indulge into narcissistic introspec-
tion, and replace the study of Tunisian politics with the sole analysis of one’s 
positionality. Finally, it does not seek to give credit to the binary view accord-
ing to which Western academics and politicians keep exploiting the South. The 
grandiose congress organized in May 2016 by Ennahda shows very well how 
Tunisian political actors have quickly learned to instrumentalize the new ap-
petite of Western scholars for Tunisian politics. Ennahda carefully invited a 
selection of Western scholars, journalists, and experts, and omitted to invite 
many Tunisian social scientists. It is important, therefore, to acknowledge the 
fact that scholarship and authoritative discourse about the Tunisian revolu-
tion and transition is being produced in a highly politicized context, and that 
any claim to the scientific neutrality of this expertise should be approached 
critically.
The Tunisian revolution has opened up a unique space for free speech. From 
this open space, however, many stereotypical representations and speeches 
have promptly emerged. A post revolutionary mainstream culture has formed 
3 Mona Abaza, “Academic Tourists Sight-Seeing the Arab Spring,” ahramonline, September 26, 
2011, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/22373.aspx.
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that implies a commodification of icons (such as the portraits of Bouazizi), 
symbols, martyrs, and slogans (such as “dégage/irhal”) of the revolution. No 
matter how trendy or idealized, this new normative semiotics needs to be seen 
critically. Fanon has shown that the codification of the indigenous culture into 
a set of folkloric stereotypes was instrumental to the spread of the colonial 
rule.4  With his observation in mind, one may suggest that, in Tunisia’s present 
context, the inevitable transformation of revolutionary disorder into a norma-
tive and commodified culture implies an analogous risk of perpetuating rela-
tions of inequality between the producers of these new codes (young artists, 
civil society activists…) and the Western ngo’s, foundations, or associations 
(however well meaning) that seek to fund such a culture. An effect of the cod-
ification of the post-revolution culture is to neutralize the power of dissent 
and critique by turning it into a cool and artistic commodity. While no one 
writing about revolutions and transitions can claim to speak from a perfect 
position of neutrality and objectivity, it is important for scholars of Tunisia to 
look critically at the depoliticizing impact of this new culture. As Fanon has 
argued, intellectuals and academics may contribute to the transformation of 
the “power of invocation” expressed through popular art and culture into a 
“power of convocation”.5
A Conservative Revolution
While a lot of ink has been spent on whether the events of 2011 should be la-
beled as a revolution, a social movement, an uprising, it seems more produc-
tive to both acknowledge the radicalness of the 2011 break and to try to under-
stand the post 2011 changes as the effects of internal mutations, beyond the 
rhetoric of the tabula rasa.
The articles gathered in this special issue offer an interpretation of Tuni-
sia’s transition that breaks away from common evaluative endeavors that 
seek to define the degree to which the country has succeeded or failed. While 
acknowledging the significance of the 2011 rupture, this issue is more inter-
ested in understanding the 2011–2014 period in relation to former decades of 
authoritarian power and modernist-secularist rhetoric. The Tunisian revolu-
tion is part of a longue durée trajectory that includes the pre-colonial, colonial, 
statist and the neoliberal moments. Authors of this issue insist on the constitu-
tive ambiguity of the revolutionary moment and process. Rather than seeing 
4 Frantz Fanon, Les Damnés de la terre (1961; repr., Paris: La Découverte, 2002), 211.
5 Ibid., 231.
 123The Struggle for Meanings and Power in Tunisia
middle east law and governance 8 (2016) 119-130
<UN>
the revolution as a clean break from the past and an uncontested founding 
moment of a democratic phase, the authors show, from different perspective, 
the looming impact of past historical structures. The possibilities of change 
undeniably opened by the 2011 revolution have to be understood within these 
specific constraints of Tunisia’s political history. Asef Bayat defines a revolu-
tion as “rapid transformation of the State, driven by popular support”.6 From 
this point of view, what has occurred in Tunisia is not a proper revolution. State 
institutions and the pillars of the deep state (corrupt businessmen, police, 
bureaucracy) have remained untouched. The new legal instruments planned 
by the 2014 constitution in order to reinforce the protection of the rule of law 
(the constitutional court, the transitional justice) face numerous challenges 
and critiques. Very early on, the political leaders from the major parties have 
defended the need for the continuity and safeguarding of the state. The shared 
panic caused by the idea of a possible state collapse has contributed to the af-
firmation of reformism as the legitimate horizon of politics. This is how a trend 
that has characterized Tunisian politics since the 18th century has ironically 
been reinforced by the 2011 revolution.7 Five years after the revolution, the Tu-
nisian state appears at once as oddly resilient –especially when compared to 
other Arab spring countries- and failing. The spread of informal economy, the 
weakening of borders, the proliferation of corruption, the increase of strikes 
and social movements represent a significant challenge to the ideal of state 
consolidation. In order to understand what makes the Tunisian revolution so 
singular, it’s important to examine the slow and chaotic process of transforma-
tion of the state and society, and to show how structures and memories are 
renegotiated rather than eradicated. By emphasizing the enduring influence of 
some political norms and discourse, the essays gathered here suggest that the 
2011 uprisings gave birth to a conservative revolution, and to a democracy that 
is partly governed by forces of restoration.
 Hegemony
Very early on after the first uprisings of 2010, two interpretations of politi-
cal change competed in the political sphere. For some political parties and 
6 Asef Bayat, “Revolution in Bad Times,” New Left Review 80 (March-April 2013), https:// 
newleftreview.org/ii/80/asef-bayat-revolution-in-bad-times#_ednref8.
7 Béatrice Hibou, “La formation asymétrique de l’Etat en Tunisie : Les territoires de l’injustice,” 
in L’Etat d’injustice au Maghreb. Maroc et Tunisie, ed. Irène Bono, Béatrice Hibou, Hamza 
Meddeb and Mohamed Tozy (Paris: Karthala, 2015), 99–150.
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social movements the 2011 revolution was a radical break from the past and the 
foundation of a new political order. Other social and political players saw the 
uprisings as an episode of violence that simply called for the reform of the state 
(notably the ministry of Interior), and a better redistribution of resources. This 
second view has become the main currency of the official political discourse 
since 2014. Widely celebrated as peaceful and relatively transparent, the parlia-
mentary and presidential elections of 2014 have in fact opened up a new period 
in which the notion of consensus bas become a stifling norm of the political 
transactions between new and old political elites. The pluralistic compromise 
painfully achieved during the 2011–2014 period in the Tunisian Constitutional 
Assembly gave way to a “rotten compromise” between the two former enemies, 
Ennahda and Nida Tounes.8 In the context of the multiplication of terrorist at-
tacks and the weakening of security at the borders, notions of national unity, 
stability, and consensus took precedence over ideas of dissent, contestation, 
and pluralism.
In order to analyze this shift between pluralist openness and closure, and 
the competition between two interpretations of the uprisings, a number of au-
thors of this issue resort to the Gramscian notion of hegemony. The concept,9 
describing the moral and political leadership through which a dominant class 
manages to obtain consent from a large part of society, and to defuse conflict 
through pacific means, seems well adapted to describe the practice of power 
by the new Ennahda-Nida coalition. An essential aim of the post 2014 official 
rhetoric was to delegitimize political dissent and to criminalize social pro-
test.10 Officials from Nida Tounes and Ennahda both called for the postponing 
of divisive political debate about key issues such as economic reform, transi-
tional justice, or the constitutional court. The settlement of such divisive issue, 
it was argued, should be postponed and priority should be given to preserv-
ing stability, security and unity as attested in the “Carthage document” signed 
8 Nadia Marzouki, “Tunisia’s Rotten Compromise,” Middle East Research and Information 
Project, July 10, 2015, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero071015?ip_login_no_cache=cb1fe9f
2401f5e5597089a6bfb62865d.
9 John Schwarzmantel, The Routledge Guidebook to Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks (Routledge, 
2015), 96–104; Antonio Gramsci, “Hegemony, Relations of Force, Historical Bloc,” in The 
Gramsci Reader, Selected Writings, 1916–1935, ed. David Forgacs (New York : New York 
University Press, 2000), 189–222.
10 In September 2015, the mufti of the republic, a highest official religious authority 
announced a fatwa saying that social protests are religiously “haram” because they are 
harmful for the country and they delay economic recovery. A fatwa that has been criti-
cized by the civil society organisations and mocked by activists and Young people in the 
social media.
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by political parties and national organizations that accepted to participate in 
the negotiations for the implementation of a National government unity. The 
only acceptable objective for political and social actors is to work for the re-
construction of the supposedly specific Tunisian synthesis between Islam and 
modernism. Sami Zemni shows how the ruling coalition has resuscitated the 
idea of “tunisianité”. It refers to a form of collective consciousness supposedly 
based on an inherent inclination toward moderation and reform, rather than 
violence. According to Zemni, the reiteration of this reference aims at creat-
ing hegemony: “it creates consent to the ruling classes and social groups, their 
leadership in ruling the nation because of their apparent ability to address and 
resolve societal problems and their prestige”. Similarly, Mathilde Zederman ex-
plains that the celebration of Bourguiba across ideological groups also serves 
to foreclose the space for political debates, and to consolidate the hegemony 
of the ruling coalition. She argues that some Islamists – even though they had 
suffered the most from the authoritarian modernist secularism defined by the 
first President of Tunisia- now seek to present themselves as the sons of Bour-
guiba. Retracing the ways in which governments have resorted to emergency 
law since the independence, Brahim Rouabah and Corinna Mullin show how 
the definition of modernity as a norm, and the exceptionalization of all forms 
of solidarity (tribal, regional, ideological) that could threaten the modernist 
ideal of the national state, have reinforced the hegemony of Bourguiba and 
Ben Ali’s regimes. Loes Debuysere demonstrates how the discourse about “the 
Tunisian woman” (always in singular) has been an integral part of the modern-
ist mythology, and of the hegemony of the ruling party.
The Gramscian concept of hegemony is relevant to think about Tunisian 
politics not only because it adequately describes rhetorical and practical 
mechanisms of neutralization of dissent. It also allows us to interrogate three 
dimensions of political change that the narrative of the Tunisian democratic 
miracle has obfuscated. First, Gramsci’s conceptualization of hegemony is 
closely related to the concepts of class and violence. Second, his reflection on 
hegemony opens up on a critique of the use of dogmatic historicism to jus-
tify colonialism. Finally his theory of the neutralization of dissent leaves open 
the possibility of subversion. Hegemony is often wrongly reduced to a strategy 
of cultural influence through which a dominant elite strives to obtain popu-
lar consent.11  This widespread interpretation tends to obscure the fact that 
the struggle for hegemony is inseparable from a class struggle. For Gramsci, 
11 On the various usages and (mis)interpretations of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, see 
Gianfranco Rebucini, “Cultures, Hégémonies et Subjectivités : ‘Traductions’ de Gramsci 
dans les Sciences Sociales Critiques Anglophones,” Actuel Marx 57 (2015): 82–95.
Marzouki and Meddeb
middle east law and governance 8 (2016) 119-130
<UN>
126
a hegemonic apparatus is the ensemble of means, institutions, discourse 
and practice through which a class (either bourgeois or working) succeeds in 
translating its power in civil society into a power in political society. Moreover, 
the consent produced through hegemony should not be mistaken with social 
peace: it is merely a recodification and provisional neutralization of social 
aggressiveness. In Tunisia, an unfortunate effect of the overemphasis on con-
sensus and reform in political and historiographic discourse is the tendency 
to expurgate violence and class struggle from political history.12 Resorting to 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to discuss Tunisian politics is relevant not 
only to understand the production of consent, but also because it may help re-
instate social violence and class struggles as understudied and yet determinant 
factors of current changes. As a matter of fact, the invocation of consensus 
by the Tunisian ruling elite does not reflect a political and social context of 
peace and positive adhesion to a popular ideology. Rather it reveals a precari-
ous equilibrium among fragile political forces that are increasingly alienated 
from social forces.
Gramsci’s critique of the dogmatic historicism of the Marxist Italian phi-
losopher Antonio Labriola is also pertinent to debunk the modernist mythol-
ogy underlying Tunisia’s history of nation building. In the Southern Question,13 
Gramsci criticizes Labriola’s determinist view of progress, and his defense of 
the colonization of the people from the South of Italy. While Labriola com-
pared them to children in need of reeducation, Gramsci opposed the racial-
ization and pathologization of the peasants from the South. Much of the 
discourse of the Tunisian elite that claims to defend the modernist legacy of 
Bourguiba sadly echoes Labriola’s view on the South. Regions from the South 
and the hinterland have been consistently defined as a problem rather than 
as a resource. Their alleged backwardness has been attributed to the suppos-
edly inherent features of their character or social structures, rather than to the 
asymmetrical process of state formation. The marginalization of the interior 
regions is the result of an enduring politics of subordination that started in 
the beylical era, and was reinforced under the colonial rule, and then willingly 
perpetuated by the development and investment strategies of both Bourguiba 
and Ben Ali’s regimes 1956. In other words, the revival of Bourguibism does 
not only refer to the battle between secularism and Islamism. It also reflects 
12 Béatrice Hibou, “Le Réformisme, Grand Récit Politique de la Tunisie Contemporaine,” 
Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine 56–4 no. 4 (2009): 14–53.
13 Antonio Gramsci, “Some Aspects of the Southern Question,” in The Gramsci Reader, Se-
lected Writings, 1916–1935, ed. David Forgacs (New York : New York University Press, 2000) 
171–89.
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a historically well-entrenched and historical bias in favor of the urban coastal 
provinces and at the expense of the rural hinterland and South. Gramsci’s re-
flection on the southern question offers important insights to think about the 
process whereby the Tunisian post-independence state has sought to affirm its 
sovereignty while at the same time reproducing some colonial and subordinat-
ing dynamics towards some segments of its people.
To some extent, the Tunisian conservative revolution bears resemblance 
with what Gramsci calls a “passive revolution”:14 a political change that leads 
to the partial transformation of political institutions, but that involves the en-
durance of a pacifying power. In contrast with the French revolution that led 
to the political affirmation of large parts of the working classes, in a passive 
revolution, Gramsci argues, the revolutionary segments of society remain neu-
tralized. In Tunisia, the key role that ugtt members or Ennahda representa-
tives have played in the taming of protests wherever they have erupted; the 
progressive loss of influence of medium rank bureaucrats who used to act as 
mediators between local populations and the government; the cooptation of 
new Ennahda elites by old elites of the former regime; and the cooptation of 
key leaders of the popular class and interior regions into the political system 
through ugtt and political parties, all contribute to the pacification and neu-
tralization of the revolution.
While Gramsci’s thoughts help us build a sobering understanding of the 
present state of post-revolution Tunisia, they are equally valuable to think 
more positively about the possibilities of subversion. Gramsci sees hegemony 
as the moral and political leadership a class has gained by successfully hiding 
the unequal social relations that form the basis of its claim to defend moder-
nity and equality. In other words, the creation of consent necessarily engages a 
distortion and mystification of reality. It is based on “a politics of the absence 
of truth”.15 Subversion therefore implies an unveiling of the myths underpin-
ning the hegemony of a class. The Tunisian revolution may not have succeeded 
in transforming state institutions or in politically empowering significant parts 
of civil society. But it has succeeded in debunking the mythology of moder-
nity and Tunisianité, despite their persistent instrumentalization by political 
leaders. President Beji Caïd Essebsi has based its campaign in 2014 on the 
need to reinstate the prestige of the state, and has painfully tried to mimic 
14 Antonio Gramsci, “The concept of passive revolution,” in Forgacs, The Gramsci Reader, 
p. 263–67.
15 “The Gramscian Moment”: An Interview With Peter Thomas,” by Martin Thomas, The 
Trim, May 19, 2011, http://thetrim1.blogspot.com/2014/03/the-gramscian-moment-inter-
view-with.html.
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Bourguiba (through his clothing, glasses, speeches). Yet, there is not a wide 
support, let alone consent, to this Bourguibolatry cultivated by Nida Tounes 
and some members of Ennahda. Essebsi’s attempts at imitating his predeces-
sor are regularly made fun of. His decision to reinstall the statue of Bourguiba 
on his horse on the main avenue of Tunis has upset a large part of the youth.16
Tunisia’s current politics seem defined by a negative or ironical form of 
hegemony that it is based on the neutralization of dissent much more than on 
a positive consent to an ideology. The narrative of Tunisian modernity func-
tions as an ideology by default. The ruling coalition refers to it because it has 
nothing more substantial or programmatic to put forward. In that sense, there 
is not “politics of absence of truth”, but rather, a politics of absence tout court. 
There is no positive ideology to debunk or unveil. This absence creates a space 
for subversion and possibly for the continuation of the 2011 revolution. In this 
issue, Charles Tripp shows how artists have appropriated the public space 
(with graffitis, performances, dance improvisation, songs, theater…): irrever-
ence and provocation towards state authority (and notably the police) are an 
essential part of their art. Other scholars have argued elsewhere that despite 
the shrinking of the space for political conflicts within government or the 
arp since 2014, social forces have remained quite active and have shown their 
capacity to organize protest.17 Other significant attempts at disturbing the sta-
tus quo and projects of restoration of the ancien regime include the movement 
against the Reconciliation Bill, Mnish msamah (I won’t forgive),18 protests and 
strikes in the mining area of Gafsa, strikes and riots in Tataouine and Kasser-
ine. Street politics becomes the main channel for socio-economic demands, 
as the institutions are unable to mediate social conflicts. It remains unclear, 
however, whether these sectorial and fragmented movements can coalesce 
into a counter-hegemony to the present hegemony. The present uncertainty 
may not lead to the collapse of the fragile democracy or to the reverting into 
authoritarianism. Rather, it is very likely that the growing popular discontent 
will lead to the survival, for some time, of an unconsolidated and weak demo-
cratic order.
16 Inel Tarfa, “Bourguiba Statue Unveiled Despite Cost Concerns,” Tunisia-live, June 1, 2016, http://
www.tunisia-live.net/2016/06/01/borguiba-statue-unveiled-despite-cost-concerns/.
17 Laryssa Chomiak, “The Revolution in Tunisia Continues,” Middle East Institute, Septem-
ber 22, 2016, http://www.mei.edu/content/map/revolution-in-tunisia-continues.
18 This bill grants amnesty to the businessmen and bureaucrats guilty of having illegally 
financially benefited from the Ben Ali’s regime.
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 Outline
This special issue is composed of six articles. The first four articles look at 
how some legal and discursive norms regarding national identity, security and 
gender have coalesced into hegemonic forms of speech and policy that have 
significantly reduced the space for pluralism and dissent. The two last articles 
examine sites and activities through which individuals have managed, since 
2011, to challenge the hegemony of party leaderships or narratives about na-
tional identity.
Sami Zemni explains how, after Ben Ali’s escape, the discovery of a conflict-
ridden society led to a polarized debate about the definition of the Tunisian 
people. The discourse on tunisianité served as a hegemonic discourse that 
was meant to help bridging the gap between opposing views on who or what 
constitutes the people. However, tunisianité and the call for the restoration of 
the state’s prestige (haybat addawla) also signaled the possibility of political 
closure; i.e. the rejection and de-legitimization of political subjectivities that 
do not subscribe to this view of national identity.
Extending the timeframe of analysis beyond the post-revolution period, 
Corinna Mullin and Brahim Rouabah retrace the way in which emergency law 
has been used by the state in the colonial and postcolonial era. Specifically, the 
article focuses on how the state of emergency contributes to the reinforcement 
of dominant narratives about national identity, tolerance, moderation, order, 
and state prestige.
Mathilde Zederman shows how the national narrative of ‘modernism’ con-
veyed by Bourguiba in the post-independence era has transformed into an 
arena of struggle over power and identity. She examines the ways in which the 
Bourguibist political idiom serves to legitimate certain ideological agendas and 
views on what is deemed the ‘right’ Tunisian national identity. Questioning the 
facile binaries that place Islamists and so-called ‘secularists’ in opposition, her 
article focuses on commonalities within their respective appropriations of the 
Bourguibist legacy in the post-revolutionary context.
Loes Debuysere shows how, ever since Habib Bourguiba made women the 
pivot of his modernist politics in post-independence Tunisia, Tunisian wom-
en have figured as a crucial pillar of a hegemonic discourse, celebrating the 
specificity of moderate and ‘feminist’ Tunisian identity. She goes on to explain 
why,four years into the revolution, this understanding of feminity ultimately 
survived and remains influential.
Deborah Perez offers a detailed analysis of the daily interactions among 
deputies of the Constituent National Assembly (2011–2014) in order to chal-
lenge micro-analyses that argue that the constitution was merely the outcome 
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of a pact among party leaders. She emphasizes the importance of contingency 
and improvisation that granted deputies a margin of autonomy towards the 
party leaderships.
Charles Tripp argues that through artistic interventions – graffiti, visual 
street art, performances, demonstrations, banners, slogans – citizens have 
appropriated the public sphere. Despite the monitoring of political dissent 
through persuasion or coercion, an activist public has created highly visible 
public spaces, assisted and encouraged by citizen artists. They have gener-
ated debates and have helped to give substance to competing visions of the 
republic.
